The GOP’s election song

I’ve been hearing a lot of analyses about the recent Republican failure being due to a “culture of corruption” amongst Republicans. That’s horse puckey that’s being sold by the MSM. The Dems are equally corrupt (for goodness sake, land grabber Harry Reid is now the leading Democratic Senator), so corruption can’t be the reason voters left the Republicans. They left the Republicans, because Republicans left conservatism. They became Washington political hacks, more concerned with pleasing their congressional colleagues than with pleasing the voters.
And so I think that I’ve found the right song for the GOP in the wake of this election. Although most of the song — a reminscence of 50s rock ‘n roll — is inapposite, I’m convinced that the new GOP song should Ricky Nelson’s “Garden Party” — or at least the first verse and chorus:

I went to a garden party to reminisce with my old friends
A chance to share old memories and play our songs again
When I got to the garden party, they all knew my name
No one recognized me, I didn’t look the same

CHORUS
But it’s all right now, I learned my lesson well.
You see, ya can’t please everyone, so ya got to please yourself

Conservative voters no longer recognize themselves in Republican politicians. Getting along in Washington, which is a distasteful necessity or the political process collapses, nevertheless shouldn’t mean that politicians abandon the core convictions that got them to D.C. in the first place. The GOP should use the next two wilderness years to recognize that Republicans can’t please everybody — certainly not their Democratic colleagues in Washington — so they’d better start pleasing themselves, which means returning to core values.

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Comments

  1. says

    That’s horse puckey that’s being sold by the MSM.

    You got it right, Bookworm, absolute freaking right.

    They left the Republicans, because Republicans left conservatism.

    But still, you have to admit that the MSM Foley contribution did a lot of good things for the Demos.

    Jacksonians were the ones who supported the war, and unless the Republicans give the Jacksonian war lobby some red meat in the form of dead enemy bodies lining the streets, bad things are going to happen to the party that supported the Iraq invasion. Maybe you could get away in war time, with some kind of skirmish fighting, but not when the Democrats are concocting all kinds of corruption scandals and what nots.

    If you can’t win domestically, then you got to get the war, but if you don’t got the war and you don’t got domestic support, then well, some things are going to collapse.

  2. erp says

    Politics is the art of the possible. Those on the right who stayed away from the polls will soon find they made a very big mistake. Unfortunately, well all feel their pain.

  3. Danny Lemieux says

    It isn’t just that Republicans abandoned their principles, it is that they behaved like pigs at the trough (ala “Bridge to Nowhere”). Most politicians know that the real value of a congressional (or Senate) seat is not what they do during office, it is what they stand to get once they are out of office. The Republicans were toThe culture of corruption is a bi-partisan enterprise buto busy feathering their own nests with side deals and personally enriching earmarks to realize that they were exposing themselves for the phonies that they were. The culture of corruption is a bi-partisan enterprise but, sadly, the Democrats are much more savvy than Republicans at enriching themselves at the public trough…they’ll get away with it because they know their party loyalists will forgive anything as long as they move their ideology down field.

  4. says

    Hi, Book. I would say it was the war in Iraq. The known narrative – which may be correct – is that we’re neither winning it nor losing it. That’s unnacceptable to a nation that recalls Vietnam, whether you recall it from the left or from the right.

    I’ve been crazy about George over the Iraq war for some time. Planting democracy right in the heart of Arabia, etc. And I’m not competent to judge the competency with which it’s been conducted. Possibly it’s been conducted well – counterinsurgencies tend to last 5-10 years no matter what.

    But that’s not being explained to us.

    Cheers!

  5. says

    Something said on Blackfive. The Iraqis now have 6 months to win it, cause if they take any longer, the Democrats will cut them loose. The situation now demands ruthless and efficient action. There is no time to be p footing around, and playing games. Not for the Iraqis and not for the Americans. Do or Die. Deathmatch round.

    I’ve said this before I think, to Bush. Either use your power or lose your power. Use them or lose them, Iraq.

  6. T.S. says

    Something said on Blackfive. The Iraqis now have 6 months to win it, cause if they take any longer, the Democrats will cut them loose. – Ymar

    Before the war, Brent Scowcroft wrote an editorial on why the U.S should not invade Iraq. Reports regarding George H.W Bush’s and Norman Schwartzkoph’s take on the repurcussions of taking out Saddam (that we’d get stuck in an unwinnable guerilla war)began to resurface. And PBS ran a wonderful expose called “the War Behind Closed Doors,” featuring the battle between Bush 41′s realists and the neoconservative idealogues who ended up winning Bush 43′s ear. The neoconservatives won. For a brief moment in time. And now Americans understand a bit more about them and their agenda, which is why neoconservatism is dead for at least a generation.

    As I’ve written before, the best criticism did not come from “the left,” but from members of Bush 41′s team. Between James Baker’s report and Gates’ nomination as Defense Secretary, the chant is now “two more years” — of Poppy Bush’s presidency – not junior’s.

    What does the future hold? I’m guessing it’s written in the Baker Report and not in anything the Democrats do or don’t do.

  7. says

    Just goes to show you, America is so in doubt and fractured, that if you won’t get stabbed in the back from the Left, you’ll get quagmired from the Right. Go far enough to the right, and you’ll hit the left. A fundamental truism of all times and peoples.

    Bush and Schwarzkopf had a duty and obligation that was unfullfilled. I don’t listen to honorless people walking around.

    Schwarzkopf knows this, and Bush 41 knows this as well, the only people that don’t know this, that uses Bush 41 and S’s views as propaganda for their Leftist isolationism, are the far right, T.S.

    They aren’t the right, not when they are allied to the Left. It is a weird thing to say that Bush 41 is allied with the far left, who attacks his son viciously in a way that 41 hates, but there you have it. The followers of Bush 41 and his policies, people like you T.S., were not sufficient to give Bush 41 a second term, for a reason. Bush 41 did the one thing that Jacksonians hate. Which is starting a war but not finishing it, and then having that weakness flung into our faces with the deaths of innocents. Jacksonians hate that, beyond all else, primarily because of Vietnam. And the fact that Bush raised taxes with his read my lips lie, and Jacksonians hate lies and corruption too.

    I don’t want far rightists or the left running this country. It is not an insult to the religious right, to say so, I’m in the middle because I do not have loyalties to socialism nor religious dogma. Yet I’m not a libertarian interested solely in self-aggrandizement, either. My values are consistent with the values held by conservatives, and since most conservatives are polite, my political alliances are with them. Yours may differ, TS.

    The fact is, Bush 41 and Norman aren’t the people TS would like them to be. I see from his comments, talking about how 41 and Norman are this or that, supporting his arguments here and there. Wrong.

    Some of the more poignant moments in the interview that I recommend that anyone interested in the real Norman, should read.

    Q: Some have said that it was your opinion you could never get any strategic guidelines out of Washington….

    Schwarzkopf: Whenthe Normandy Invasion was planned, a very specific strategic objective was given, and that strategic objective was the basis upon which the plan for the Normandy Invasion was derived.

    We never had such a strategic directive. We had a series of phone calls… most of which were not followed up with hard copy… saying, “Do this, do that, what we think we ought to do is that, what we might want to do is that”. and so there a came a point where, where all of us were saying, “Okay, it seems to me that all the decisions have been made. Let’s have a strategic directive”.

    I think that more importantly people were saying “What, what will the end game be? You know, when do we terminate all this? What is it we’re trying to accomplish at the end of the day? What do we expect to see on the ground? What are the terms of cessation of hostilities? Will we use nuclear weapons?”

    You know, looking for some sort of an outline and form within which, you know, the military people could in fact make the decisions that the military people needed to make, once the political decisions had been made.

    We never had that. And as a result, what we had to do, all of us, we had to make assumptions about the political decisions to therefore fit the military plans to what we assumed were the political conditions. And then of course, if one of those conditions changed it kind of threw everything into a cocked hat, and we had to go back to ground zero, not necessarily …

    Q: Everyone’s always said to me “Oh, they had a very clear objective” you know, “Get rid of the Iraqis from Kuwait.” Could you explain to me in headline terms, just very briefly, why wasn’t that good enough?

    Schwarzkopf: Well I think, I think… What has happened since then… is a pretty clear example of why that probably wasn’t good enough.

    I mean the whole question that we hear over and over again, “Why didn’t you go to Baghdad and, and capture Saddam Hussein? Why didn’t you inflict greater damage on the Republican Guard?” When the decision was made to end the war, the decision was made, it’s because I had accomplished all of my military objectives. The things that now that people are talking about, capturing Saddam Hussein, destroying … inflicting more damage on the Republican Guard, etc., etc., etc., these are political decisions, far beyond the military realm.

    I had to establish my own objectives, and my own objectives frankly turned out to be, you know, number one objective: Iraqis out of Kuwait, number two: inflict as much damage as I could on their armed forces so they couldn’t come back another day.

    The kick them out of Iraq objective was one that was given to us by United Nations Resolution. But the second part of this thing; inflict maximum damage upon the Iraqi armed forces so that they cannot return, you know, shortly thereafter, was another objective that evolved. But again you’ll never find that in writing, anywhere

    Q: What did you say to them, for example about the Republican Guard?

    Schwarzkopf: Well I told them that I had identified the Republican Guard as one of the two centers of gravity. You know Clausewitz says center of gravity is that thing which, if destroyed, will destroy the will of the enemy to fight.

    I had identified two centers of gravity in the Iraqi military. One was Saddam Hussein himself. And number two was the Republican Guard, because the Republican Guard was the elite force of the Iraqi army and if the Republican Guard collapsed, then the rest of the Iraqi army wasn’t going to hold together.

    So, basically, I described how we were going to cut off Saddam Hussein from his ability to issue directives to the frontline forces, through the strategic air campaign. And then secondly, I told how from day one we would start attacking the Republican Guard and we would continue to attack them relentlessly until the final ground assault, er, succeeded.

    Norman is a guy that knows the cost of war, but understands also that you can’t be letting the Arabs get off thinking they can play with us.

    Q: How did you feel about that? You said in your book that you thought about the casualties, you thought about the cost of war.

    Schwarzkopf: Well I think it’s fair to say that anyone who picks the military as a career prepares all their lives for war, but hopes they will never have to go to war. Certainly more senior commanders, maybe not the junior commanders, maybe they want to get in there… But certainly anyone who’s been around the military as long as I had you, you would hope that you can avoid war, because war costs people their lives. I mean your own forces, the enemy forces, innocent civilians that are caught in between. And therefore war should be the last, very very last recourse.

    And so, you know, you’re torn by two ends. Number one you are going through detailed preparations to make sure you do do it right and you do prevail. And at the same time another part of you is saying you know, “Gosh, it would be really be nice if somehow this could all be brought about to a necessary conclusion without the need to go to war.”

    Q: If the Iraqis at that stage had offered to withdraw, would you have regarded that as victory?

    Schwarzkopf: If the Iraqis at that stage had offered to withdraw, I would have regarded that as victory, yes. But I would qualify that with saying that it had to be done in such a way that there some assurances that the same thing wouldn’t happen six months from now. That was the problem. The Arab world was very concerned about the win-win scenario, where Saddam Hussein withdraws, we win but he wins too, and is in a position where he can now intimidate the entire Arab world from now on by saying “Remember what I did to Kuwait. I can always come back and do it again!” I offer as an intellectual exercise–”What do you think would have happened in the early days of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, if Saddam Hussein had said… `Gee, you’re right world! I did something wrong. I will pull my forces out of Kuwait.’ Then he pulled his forces back and stopped just short of the Rumaila oilfields and kept them all for himself, and said `Oh, by the way, there’s always been a border point of dispute here. I think I’ll just keep all these oilfields!’

    I somewhat facetiously say that I spent a great deal of time trying to get into Saddam Hussein’s thinking. And, in hindsight all I would’ve had to have done is pick the absolutely stupidest course of action every time, and I would’ve been pretty close to predicting what was going to happen.
    Right on, Stormin Norman.

    If you want the “right”, then be assured, you will get micromanagement of the right.

    So we were diverting huge amounts of aircraft which could be contributing to the overall campaign plan. As a result the campaign plan was being prolonged because we weren’t accomplishing on the time schedule we’d planned to accomplish, because of this diversion.

    Please don’t misunderstand me. I clearly understand the pressures that were on Washington and why they were doing it. But it was the only time during the entire war, where we started getting sort of the operational-type instructions from Washington DC.

    Up until that time Washington had been very content to let the military people in the field do the job of the military people in the field. And, and now all of a sudden we were getting more of the, you know, “Why don’t you go out and do this? Why don’t you go do that? Why isn’t it…” And I would say that although I was somewhat frustrated by it, the person that was really really frustrated was poor Chuck Horner. I mean it was just driving him crazy.

    The interview is long, if you think the parts I’m quoting is long, you should hit the link at the bottom of this comment.

    Q: And all the time, every day, you were worrying about casualties. It’s a dominant theme. What was your nightmare scenario?

    Schwarzkopf: My nightmare scenario was the fact that our forces would attack into Iraq, and find themselves in such a great concentration that they became targeted by chemical weapons or some sort of a rudimentary nuclear device that would cause mass casualties.

    That’s exactly what the Iraqis did in the Iran/Iraq war. They would take the attacking masses of the Iranians, let them run up against their barrier system, and when there were thousands of people massed against the barrier system, they would drop chemical weapons on them and kill the thousands of people.

    We knew that they had done this in the Iran/Iraq war. There was every reason to believe that they would do it opposing us. And we also knew that they had some limited nuclear capability, and thought that perhaps they could assemble some sort of very very rudimentary device which they could detonate.

    We were particularly worried about that area out to the east, that the envelopment was going to come through, because I for one could never understand why it was that area was left wide open and unprotected. And, I had my intelligence staff using terms like `chemical killing sack’, `nuclear detonation area’ and this sort of thing to describe possible scenarios as to why that area was left open.

    Wait, I thought Saddam didn’t have WMDs?

    This was from Colin Powell, the absolute force warrior.

    Q: The cruise missile.. various people have talked to me about it.. Colin Powell rang you up and said “Jesus Christ, every time you pull the trigger it’s another two million bucks”. How did it come that they weren’t fired anymore?

    Schwarzkopf: Well just about what you said. The cruise missiles were a very very important part of the initial strategic air campaign and they were very effective and worked you know, fine fashion, relatively speaking.

    But of course, they’re very expensive and the United States also has a limited inventory of cruise missiles and so at one point Colin called me up and said, you know “I hope you realise that every time you fire another one of these cruise missiles, you know, it’s two million bucks flying off into the air there and I wish you’d consider other ways of accomplishing the same mission if you can”.

    So I turned to Chuck Horner and.. and passed those instructions on to him and said, you know “Let’s not fire any more cruise missiles unless that’s the only way to get the job done or you know, obviously if we’re going to put a lot of peoples lives at risk doing it some other way, we didn’t want to do it that way because, although cruise missiles cost you two million dollars they don’t cost you any human life”.

    But that was basically why we scaled back the use of cruise missiles.

    Q: They say they stopped it because you told them you’d achieved everything.

    Schwarzkopf: We had achieved all of our military objectives.

    Q: Let me rephrase this to you….. just for the record I’m trying to establish, did you feel that the driving force was coming from the White House or was it a matter of you saying “No no, we’ve done everything, let’s finish it” or was it, as others have told me who were close to you, that you felt that the White House was saying “Hey, we’d really like to stop this”.

    Schwarzkopf: Oh there’s no question about the fact that this was presented to me as a fait accompli in Washington.

    It was Washington had made the decision that they wanted the war to stop at midnight and they were just calling me to find out if I had any violent objections. You know, it was never presented “Well, we’d like to stop it at midnight but if you don’t concur with this then we’ll let you go on all day tomorrow”. That was not the case at all. It was quite the contrary, it was presented to me as a fait accomplit “Do you concur in this decision?”

    And I’d already said that I can live with it and.. to them.. I’d said that to them before and I said it again “I can live with that decision”. I didn’t say that “Oh, I’m violently… I’m euphoric about this thing and it’s absolutely the best of all possible worlds” and that sort of thing. Quite frankly I don’t think anybody could have said that at the time because you don’t have that clear a picture of what’s going on in the battlefield.

    Plain and simply, Washington came to me after we had won an overwhelming victory at a minimum loss of lives and said “We want to stop the war at midnight tonight. Do you have any problem with that?”

    And my answer was “No I don’t have any problem with that”. So it’s just that simple. There’s no more or any less to it. OK? It’s just plain and simply–that’s the context in which the message was delivered and the answer that was given.

    Get Gates and Bush 41 back, and we’ll “stop” the war. I assure you. This is what Bush 41 backers want, this is what they hunger for. Why are they different from the Left?

    Schwarzkopf: On the question of going to Baghdad. If you remember the Vietnam war, we had no international legitimacy for what we did. As a result we, first of all, lost the battle of world public opinion and eventually we lost the battle at home.

    In the Gulf War we had great international legitimacy in the form of eight United Nations Resolutions, every one of which said “Kick Iraq out of Kuwait”, did not say one word about going into Iraq, taking Baghdad, conquering the whole country and hanging Saddam Hussein. That’s point number one.

    Point number two, had we gone on to Baghdad, I don’t believe the French would have gone and I’m quite sure that the Arab coalition would not have gone, the coalition would have ruptured and the only people that would have gone would have been the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

    And, oh by the way, I think we’d still be there, we’d be like a dinosaur in a tar pit, we could not have gotten out and we’d still be the occupying power and we’d be paying one hundred percent of all the costs to administer all of Iraq.

    Thirdly, I don’t think we could have found Saddam Hussein if we’d done that. We forget the lessons of Panama. We had ten thousand Americans on the ground in Panama before we went into that very small country, we still couldn’t find a fellow named Noriega, so what makes you think that we would go into a nation the size of Iraq and be able to find one person who has all the ability in the world to escape and hide and fly out of the country.

    But I think, more importantly, there’s a strategic consideration. Saddam Hussein portrayed that war from the very beginning as “This is not a war against Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. This is the Western colonial lackey friends of Israel coming in to destroy the only nation that dare stand up to Israel, that is Iraq”.

    Had we proceeded to go on into Iraq and take all of Iraq, I think that you would have millions of people in that part of the world who would say Saddam was right, that that was the objective.

    Instead we went in, we did what the United Nations mandate asked us to do and we left and we didn’t ask for anything. We didn’t leave permanent military forces over there, we didn’t demand territory, we didn’t demand bases, and the Arabs became convinced that the West was willing to deal with them evenhandedly which has led directly, in my mind, to the progress that’s going on at the peace table an.. between Israel and the Arabs and the Palestinians. It never would have happened if Desert Storm hadn’t occurred.

    So the bottom line, as far as I’m concerned, is that sure, emotionally I would have loved to have gone to Baghdad and grabbed Saddam Hussein, but this was not an emotional decision, it was a strategic decision, and strategically we were smart enough to win the war and win the peace.

    Read the bottom part again. Do it.

    Norman is the kind of guy who is apolitical, about as apolitical as you can get a general, these days. You’ve heard Norman’s account of Bush 41 and how they handled the war. Arab coalitions, coalitions with the French. Would you go invade Iraq with these people? Let us not forget, Bush junior tried the same thing as his father, the French and the Arabs opted out. Norman understands that the decision to start a war or not start a war is up to the politicians. Regardless of his personal emotions. That commands respect. But that is not the Norman, you hear from people like TS. The Norman TS sees, is a lackey that can be used to further TS’s propaganda points, period.

    Norman’s predictions are pretty accurate, even though he was wrong on Saddam. Look, Norman is a cautious general, he likes to cover all the angles. Norman knew he couldn’t go into Iraq and invade, because Bush 41 was NOT going to do what was necessary to fund the war. But Bush junior was and is still willing to take the costs in political support and etc. Norman was operating under Bush’s father, not Bush. he knew what was up.

    Norman also can’t be blamed for not understanding the political dyanmic in the Middle East, and of Islamic Jihad. They were going to blame America regardless. Norman is a military guy, not a political analyst, or a psychological warfare expert.

    Q: What was your advice as to what to do about the uprising, the Shi’ite uprising?

    Schwarzkopf: Well I don’t know that I was asked for any advice. And as a matter of fact, I’m quite sure I wasn’t asked any advice….

    I have said all along, with that regard, we need to be very careful about how much support we give the Shi’ites. Let’s fact it, the Iranian government is predominantly behind the Shi’ites and the Iranian government has a policy of exporting its revolution to the entire rest of the world.

    So I’m not too sure that’s exactly who we should be supporting in a conflict between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. Again, you know, we need again to look at this thing from a strategic standpoint and what’s in the best interests of that entire part of the world. But I wasn’t asked advice…. I’m quite sure in my own mind that.. supporting the Shi’ite revolution is not…..in the Iran/Iraq war that occurred before that time, OK, a lot of people were rooting for Iraq over Iran because they were concerned about the very same thing.

    The Shiites go to the hand that feeds them. If you won’t support them, they will find enough Iranians to replace you.

    In conclusion. Stop fighting the last war. The most honest conclusion was that Iraq could not be taken out at that time because of political concerns and support amongst Americans. That means it will be taken care of in the future, by another President. Just like terrorism.

    Read the oral history. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/1.html

    I assure you, primary sources are the best way to learn history.

  8. says

    Btw, if anyone dislikes the length, be sure to blame T.S. You can’t expect to be trying to out argue me constantly, and think you are going to get away with it. Some topics I won’t touch precisely because it is long and involved. But if you really want to push it, then go ahead.

    We didn’t leave permanent military forces over there, we didn’t demand territory, we didn’t demand bases, and the Arabs became convinced that the West was willing to deal with them evenhandedly which has led directly, in my mind, to the progress that’s going on at the peace table an.. between Israel and the Arabs and the Palestinians. It never would have happened if Desert Storm hadn’t occurred.

    Sorry, Norman, what the Arabs and Saddam learned was that America was too scared to put the ground pounders on the ground and invade. I don’t blame Norman for having the war micromanaged from Washington D.C. But by all means, let’s have Bush 41′s administration back in control of America. That way we have the Pelosis in Congress and the Bushies in the Executive. Iraq will be finished soon when that happens.

    I’m simpling demarcating worst case scenarios, in order to bypass any lesser disaster. Bush 41, Gates, and Colin. They are all, I mean all, unproved in this war. When you have new fangled people, you better plan for disasters. And I’m planning on Gates and Pelos giving the Iraqis 6 months to do or die.

  9. says

    It is fitting in a way. The same people who were involved with the Saddam Hussein in the first place, are going to now have to deal with Saddam Hussein. I’m not saying they are going to do it any better than Bush has so far, but I will say that it is just, just deserts in a way.

    Gates didn’t want to support the Shia because of Iran. Well, now he has to get rid of the Shia militias that were created precisely because America abandoned the Shia. Jokes on you Gates, and every other person that will die because of politicians and “diplomats”.

  10. T.S. says

    The followers of Bush 41 and his policies, people like you T.S., were not sufficient to give Bush 41 a second term, for a reason. — Ymar

    Before I was a wide-eyed leftist and now I’m a follower of Poppy Bush? Make up your mind, man!

    It doesn’t really matter. Because for all intents and purposes, Bush 41 seems to have been given an honorary second term.

    From this week’s Newsweek

    “The re-emergence of Iraq Study Group voices such as Baker, Gates and Alan Simpson—all longtime friends of Bush Senior—is not unlike the entrance of Fortinbras at the conclusion of “Hamlet.” These are 41′s men, and the removal of Rumsfeld—an ancient rival of Bush Senior’s from the Ford days—is a move toward the broad middle. The apparent triumph of pragmatism over ideology on Iraq was welcome news, at least to the public. In the new NEWSWEEK Poll, 67 percent favor Bush Senior’s internationalist approach to foreign policy over his son’s more unilateral course.”

    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15674912/site/newsweek/

  11. T.S. says

    The fact is, Bush 41 and Norman aren’t the people TS would like them to be. I see from his comments, talking about how 41 and Norman are this or that, supporting his arguments here and there. – Ymar

    I’l just post some of their comments:

    “From the brief time that we did spend occupying Iraqi territory after the war, I am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit — we would still be there, and we, not the United Nations, would be bearing the costs of the occupation. This is a burden I am sure the beleaguered American taxpayer would not have been happy to take on.”– Norman Schwarzkopf (from his 1993 autobiography, It Doesn’t Take a Hero)

    “We should not march into Baghdad. To occupy Iraq would instantly shatter our coalition, turning the whole Arab world against us and make a broken tyrant into a latter-day Arab hero. Assigning young soldiers to a fruitless hunt for a securely entrenched dictator and condemning them to fight in what would be an unwinnable urban guerilla war, it could only plunge that part of the world into ever greater instability.” — George H.W. Bush (A World Transformed, 1998)

    “The Gulf War was a limited-objective war. If it had not been, we would be ruling Baghdad today — an unpardonable expense in terms of money, lives lost and ruined regional relationships,. . . “Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time thought not. They still do.” — Colin Powell, 1992 (Quoted in the book, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World)

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