Special troops are, by definition, small in number. If everyone could do what they do, they would be special. They are made up of men with unusual mental and physical strength. Again, by definition this is a subset of all men. (No disrespect meant to the majority of men who aren’t unusual in both their mental and physical strength.) Once these men are selected, they are subject to rigorous training, training that would be impossible to give to large groups. Special forces go beyond “the few, the proud.” They also fall into the class of “rare and few in number.”
Given their numeric limitations, it makes sense to use special forces sparingly. Once lost (God forbid), each member of a special forces team is very, very hard to replace. Someone needs to tell that to the President, who, flush with SEAL Team Six’s exquisite raid on Osama (a raid that subsequently resulted in the vengeance-driven loss of many members of that same team), is tasking those guys with responsibility for Afghanistan — all of Afghanistan. As Max Boot says:
The kinds of direct-action strikes that these units carry out are an integral part of any comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy–but they cannot substitute for the absence of such a strategy. That was the mistake we made in Iraq from 2003 to 2007 and in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. Now it seems Obama is making that mistake again, to judge from news reports the White House is planning to lean heavily on the Special Operations Forces as they withdraw regular troops from Afghanistan. This is not a way to defeat the Taliban, the Haqqanis, and other dangerous terrorists on the cheap–it is a way to lose the war while pretending you are doing something to win it.
To which I would add that it’s also a war to squander a special breed by placing them at unreasonable risk, so that they might no longer be there when we really need them.